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 4 
Introduction 
 
This project analyzes a historical moment in policymaking, the financial crisis of 
2007 - 2008, through the lenses provided by scholars of policymaking. This is a 
policy-oriented project that will also brush the reader up on some economic 
concepts that will illuminate the causes of the crash to contrast with the policy 
decisions we discuss. Before we dive into analysis of the policies themselves, we will 
observe what was going on in the economy and how policy is formed from 
numerous perspectives. In order to immerse the reader in the mindset of a policy-
minded political thinker, Alan Kingdon will serve as our basis of understanding. So 
as to avoid review, or putting forth too much of his argument, I will provide here 
only the bare bones of Kingdon’s perspective on policy, and save his more intricate 
“ideal types” of policymaking for Chapter 2. The policy formation process consists of 
problems, ideas and solutions. The intricacies lie within which problems are 
selected for the agenda, how ideas make it passed constraints to become solutions, 
and how those solutions affect both the problem and the public. 
Kingdon says that problems are conditions. By this he means that we live 
under conditions that we feel we cannot control like the weather, poverty, or the 
economy. When we feel that we can do something about unfavorable conditions, 
those conditions become problems that need solutions. All walks of history simply 
see poverty as a condition of societal life, but Lyndon Johnson presidentially orders 
a war on poverty, makes it a national crisis—a problem to which ideas can be 
applied. Nothing about the nature of poverty during Johnson’s presidency was 
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different from the poverty of our generations, except his advocacy made it a top-of-
the-agenda item. There are human beings, both those in elected office, and those 
unseen actors and advocates who operate closely with Washington, involved in the 
process of identifying conditions as problems and selecting ideas as solutions. There 
is nothing but these human beings making sure the most problematic conditions 
make it on the agenda and the best ideas get chosen as solutions. These actors in 
and around Washington, their preferences, allegiances, ties, and promises, create 
the conditions to which ideas usually adhere. 
Kingdon says that ideas are not created equal. Ideas that suit the political 
climate can be coupled with problems and become policy solutions. Ideas are best 
heard from specialists, or rather groups of specialists in concurrence. Specialists 
range from committee and cabinet members, to their advisors in the private sector, 
to professors and experts in various fields. An idea needs to be heard and received 
well by Congress in order for it to be considered to become policy. The specialist 
advocating an idea is a very important actor because their credibility in a 
congressional hearing may decide the fate of that idea in the policy arena. Ideas are 
tapered and ground down to fit within a set of limitations of what is acceptable in 
the political stream at the time. Solutions are essentially the ideas that can be 
coupled with the current political problems, and adhere to current political 
constraints. We can think of our study as a test of an ideal model Kingdon proposes, 
which involves a pool of specialist-proposed ideas from which Congress is free to 
pull from what they see most fitting. Kingdon’s is not the only theory we will test 
however, because we want to explain whom the policymakers act in the interest of, 
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not just whether or not they listen to specialists. Studying examples of policy in the 
making will give us an opportunity to observe why certain policies were chosen 
over more viable options and by doing so, we can find out where the key 
policymaker’s allegiances lied in 2007-2008. 
Informed by this outlook, the project begins with an initial step of tracing the 
ideas generated by specialists, long before the crash, regarding the macro economy, 
the functions of finance, and public policy. Identifying two schools of economic 
thought—the orthodox and heterodox—the project suggests that by 2007-2008 
heterodox thinking offered a more compelling account of the economic realities. The 
orthodoxy represents an interpretation of Keynes that supports the neoliberal 
agenda and relies on the concept of supply and demand creating market 
equilibrium, while the heterodoxy represents a modern money interpretation that 
relies on accounting principles to better explain macro events like a financial market 
failure. Even in the face of the crash, orthodox thinkers could neither explain, nor 
produce a working, long-term solution to the problem at hand. Champions of the 
heterodox modern money approach hold similar positions at universities, in 
government, as the famous orthodox thinkers, however the orthodoxy specialize in 
explaining market failure like the Great Depression and are unmatched in their 
understanding of their field of study. The puzzle this project wrestles with is, with 
stakes as high as they were during the 2007-2008 crisis, with reputations, 
businesses and livelihoods of millions of Americans on the line, why were the best 
possible solutions of the time not chosen? 
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Allow us to flush out our puzzle; we have two schools of thought, one of 
which can explain the conditions that make up the financial crisis problem, and the 
other that cannot, people have a lot on the line, so why does the government policy 
reflect an orthodox line of thinking? In order to get to the bottom of this, we will 
dive deeper into Kingdon and other thinkers who present different theories of how 
policy comes to be. Only once we have multiple lenses through which to interpret 
the policy solutions will we be equipped to case study three Acts of Congress that 
attempted to deal with the financial crisis.  
To provide a brief overview of the project, Chapter 1 will explore the 
conditions of the crash and show how the two schools of economic thought 
responded to it. Chapter 2 will be a literature review of political theorists’ views on 
the policymaking process. Chapter 3 takes us through three pieces of legislation that 
combatted the crash; and the final chapter will attempt to answer our question 
using our accumulated knowledge of both financial crises and multiple political 
theories of how policy is made. By figuring out why a heterodox approach was not 
taken by policymakers we will come to understand not only who made the policy 
decisions, but also to whom the these key policymakers are loyal.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Why the Crash? Crisis Concepts and Summary 
 
The financial crisis was a complex event with numerous moving parts, and produced 
a series of distinct moments of policymaking. Barring perhaps the Great Depression, 
this period of 2007 and 2008 is one of the only instances in which we see political 
administrators forced to clean up an economic mess of such proportion that theirs, 
as well as previous administrations, had allowed to form. The four decades 
preceding the crash were no ordinary times in America. Administrations since 
1970s were envious of the enormous growth and administration praising that came 
out of the wartime economy, but they were left holding the reins of a sluggish 
recession-prone economy (Wray, 2016). These post-war administrations were so 
hell-bent on growth that jobless growth out of recessions became acceptable, which 
had a ratcheting effect on employment. Each recession, or market downturn would 
bring a loss of jobs that would not be fully recovered from in the upswing (Wray, 
2016). Despite policymakers’ clear interest in helping the economy, this process was 
allowed to continue, and eventually market conditions deteriorated from crisis to 
recession. Over the economically trying post-war period that culminated in 2007 
and 2008, private sector debt climbed to all-time highs, aggregate demand fell off, 
and joblessness rates rose.  
From 2007 to 2009 the US financial system experienced, in a shocking series 
of events, the collapse of major financial institutions, bubbles popping causing the 
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depreciation of privately held assets, and a full blown stock market crash (Blinder, 
2014, 5). The major bank failures began when the government subsidized mortgage 
giant Fannie Mae issued a public refusal to purchase the riskiest subprime loans on 
February 27th, 2007. This moment signaled what the heterodoxy hoped would be 
the beginning to the end of the casino-type practices of financial institutions dealing 
in subprime markets, but it was too late to stop the crash because the damage 
financial institutions did to the economy was already done. Sure enough, Fannie 
Mae’s statement was the start to a long and messy cleanup process. Next came the 
fall of the major mortgage lenders, first New Century Financial, one of the larger 
subprime lenders. After that American Home Mortgage Investment, one of the larger 
adjustable rate mortgage lenders, filed for bankruptcy protection and Bear Sterns 
liquidated two of its hedge funds dealing in subprime loan mortgage backed 
securities in early August of 2007 (USA Today, 2013). This meant that peoples’ 
assets, their portfolios, retirement and various other funds, and their stocks in 
related companies all lost value. How much a household lost depended on things 
like when during the bubble they bought their house, how deeply invested in stocks 
and securities they were, and whether or not their employment positions were 
effected as the joblessness rate doubled over a period of a few years. 
To answer our overarching question, to who was the government loyal 
during the period of 2007 – 2008, we will try to understand the perspectives of 
specialists and policymakers, as well as look into which conditions that resulted in 
economic problems. Some of the telltale signs, lower investment, higher joblessness, 
and greater levels of public debt made it appear to some specialists that we were at 
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the precipice of another Great Depression, while to others it seemed we were 
experiencing a new normal of lower labor force participation (Wray, 2016). The 
complexity of the problem and the potential policy responses to it make this an 
especially interesting and difficult area of study. This section focuses on how 
specialists and policymakers viewed the same conditions of the crisis from either 
orthodox or heterodox positions, and came up with vastly different ideas of how to 
solve them. With the two schools of thought laid out, we will work to understand the 
conditions of the financial crisis from the most comprehensive perspective, in terms 
of sectoral balances, sovereign denominated money, and financial deregulation 
combined with innovation, all gone awry. Once we understand the difference 
between the two ways of thinking about the crash, it will be easier to see which 
school of specialist dominated which of the policies in the case study and move on to 
our larger question of why certain ideas were chosen as policy solutions above 
others. Once we understand the difference between the two ways of thinking about 
the crash, it will be easier to see which school of specialist dominated which of the 
policies in the case study and move on to our larger question of why certain ideas 
were chosen as policy solutions above others.  
 
Orthodox and Heterodox Approaches 
 
How one perceived the crash depended greatly on which of two schools of economic 
thinking one subscribed to, orthodox, or heterodox. The orthodox economist drew 
from Keynes only what the needed in order to ground their neoliberal beliefs in the 
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efficiency of free-market capitalism. During the decades preceding the crash, a few 
dozen economists questioned the orthodox line of thinking and came up against an 
infinite regression related to how control of the money supply could sustain full 
employment and price stability, which led to a misunderstanding of things like 
money creation, taxation, and the risky actions of financial institutions (Wray, 
2012). These polemic economists represent the heterodox mode of thinking. The 
heterodoxy banded together at various institutions, actively reinterpreted Keynes, 
and published furiously as they sought to understand how they were observing 
more and more indications of market fragility. Orthodox thinkers had trouble 
interpreting the crash because their fundamental beliefs relied on the invisible hand 
equilibrium between supply and demand, which they applied to a variety of macro 
and micro economic transactions, from labor to goods (Wray, 2012). The debate 
between orthodox and heterodox economists will further our understanding of how 
specialists and Congress were thinking about the conditions that made the crisis. 
The orthodoxy is very concerned with inflation and the instability that 
results from money changing in value; therefore all of their suggested policies are 
aimed at fighting inflation, resulting in a desire to keep government spending down. 
Heterodoxy on the other hand is less concerned with inflation. They believe that 
inflation will not have a negative effect on the economy because as long as interest 
paid on money is positive and close to zero, the rate of inflation will be low and 
predictable (Smithin, 1994; 2003). Heterodox theorists believe that the policy 
proposed by the orthodoxy as “disinflationary”, raising the interest rate, is actually 
more dangerous and volatile than if interest rates were set and inflation were left 
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alone. While fiscal policy can still be used to regulate aggregate demand and 
inflation, Minsky says that monetary policy has lost its effectiveness in dealing with 
inflation (Minsky from Wray, 2016). Finally, the heterodoxy believes in the power of 
fiscal policy to stabilize markets if certain mechanisms are used countercyclically, 
whereas the orthodoxy believes that finance does not matter. 
Essentially, the orthodoxy saw unemployment and the rate of growth as 
controllable via the central banking system of the US—the Federal Reserve (Fed)—
and its inflation fighting techniques. They believed that if the currency’s value 
stayed constant, that the market would reach equilibrium, supply would control 
demand, and with an endless demand for goods and services, full employment 
would obviously follow. The orthodoxy believed that central banks could maintain 
the overall health of the economy using three tools: open market operations, the 
discount rate, and the required reserve ratio. The goal of the central banks 
operations’, what is called monetary policy, was to control the rate of growth, 
inflation and unemployment (Lindsey & Wallich, 1987). Let us go over their tactics. 
Open market operations involve a central bank buying or selling securities to 
effectively raise or lower the amount of aggregate reserves. The discount rate is a 
tool of central banks to incentivize banks to hold more or less reserves or treasury 
bonds by lowering or raising returns on government bonds that banks can trade 
their excess reserves for. The goal of open market operations, and setting discount 
rates, is to affect the money aggregate and the long-term rates in order to stabilize 
the rate of growth, prices, and unemployment. The required reserve ratio is a ratio 
determined by central banks that dictates the limit to the amount of notes a bank 
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can lend in proportion to the reserves they are supplied by the central bank. What 
does belief in the effectiveness of these tools of monetary policy mean? Subscribers 
to orthodox theories believe the Fed’s monetary policies are able to keep banks on a 
leash, allowing them only to function as pipelines, to which the Fed controls the 
original flow of funds in order to stabilize the money aggregate and therefore 
stabilize the rate of growth of the economy at large. 
According to heterodox economists, monetary policy is an unreliable market 
stabilizer, fighting inflation is not an economic cure-all, and fighting unemployment 
should be the primary focus of economic policy. The heterodoxy believes that 
central banks can really only affect the market by setting the overnight interest rate, 
but these effects are slippery and come with lag. When a central bank tries to raise 
aggregate demand using monetary policy there are unforeseen long-term 
consequences. Trying to hit targets with interest rates creates what heterodox 
thinkers call a Goldilocks economy, where the Fed is in a battle of too hot and too 
cold endlessly chasing the elusive “just right.” The heterodox narrative calls for a 
fixed overnight interest rate slightly above zero. The heterodoxy believes that 
predictably low inflation causes no harm to the economy because, accompanied by 
full employment, it would make it easier to pay off debt. Despite the heterodoxy 
having little faith in monetary policy, they do believe in the power of fiscal policy to 
control market mechanisms like unemployment. Fiscal policy can be defined as 
government policy in regards to finance. The heterodoxy identified an accounting 
property that applies to the macro economy, which indicates that government 
budget deficits translate to an increase in the money supply, which if spent correctly 
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can be an effective booster of aggregate demand (Godley, 2001). In order for fiscal 
policy to be effective however, government debt needs to be countercyclical. This 
means that when the economy is in a boom, the government needs to deficit-spend 
less than when the economy is in a bust. Other stabilizing fiscal policy includes 
graded tax brackets and federally funded, guaranteed jobs for those who need them 
(Minsky in Wray, 2012). These fiscal mechanisms however, are only possible for 
governments who possess their own sovereign denominated currency with floating 
exchange rates (Foster in Wray, 2016). 
While the orthodox approach is congruent with the ideas of exogenous 
(central bank limited) money and controllable money aggregates, the heterodox 
approach is congruent with the ideas of endogenous (unrestricted by required 
reserve ratio) money, controllable interest rates, and money aggregate uncertainty. 
Controlling monetary aggregates by using one variable as a policy guide has not had 
empirical success (Lindsey & Wallach, 1987). The orthodox thinkers were not 
prepared to confront the levels of private debt arising from the bank’s unrestricted 
endogenous money creation because the orthodoxy still thought money was 
exogenously created. They still thought the Fed’s monetary policy tools controlled 
the money supply, but in reality banks were lending more than the required reserve 
ratio allowed and relying on the Fed or another bank to lend them the reserves they 
needed to maintain the required ratio. Moreover, banks were making more money 
originating loans than the Fed could possibly pay as interest on treasury bonds, 
which ameliorated the possibility of controlling bank lending with the overnight 
interest rate. Open market operations were also undermined by the banks’ 
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realization that the Fed would always supply the reserves needed to make the 
payment system clear, which meant the Fed could no longer control the money 
supply.  
We may be able to get a glimpse now of how unprepared the orthodox 
thinkers really were, but more will unfold as we come to understand the role of 
government debt in a nation with sovereign denominated fiat money. This section 
also illuminated some conditions that aggravated the crisis like reliance on Fed 
tactics to reach full employment. An orthodox thinker is likely to believe that the 
crisis resulted from the Fed temporarily raising interest rates to pop the housing 
bubble, but an orthodox thinker would say that there was more at work in terms of 
fiscal policy, misuse of the budgetary powers, and failure to adhere to sectoral 
balances. The chapter now proceeds to exploring the concepts of sovereign 
denominated currency, sectoral balances, and financial innovations and 
deregulation as a basis for better understanding the financial crisis.  
  
Sovereign Denominated Floating Fiat Money 
 
Now we reach a point at which we need to understand the perceived constraints on 
government policy response to the conditions (low investment, high unemployment 
and private debt) of the crash. What any one actor thought could solve the crisis 
came down to whether they thought they need only raise aggregate demand, or 
employment altogether, although orthodox thinkers as we discussed thought that 
both could accomplish both by fighting inflation. All the orthodox knowledge 
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pointed to controlling the money supply to fight inflation, and since the Fed was 
having trouble doing it alone, Congress stepped in with tax-cuts to stimulate 
demand. For a government believing itself to be in a deficit, this seemed to be a 
strange solution. To unpack the crisis situation we should look deeper into the 
concept of government debt.  
The US has what is called a sovereign denominated, free-floating currency, 
which means the government cannot default on debts in its own currency. During 
Nixon’s term in office, he did away with the gold standard established under the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, which took away the government debt limit, and made 
the dollar a fiat currency, backed only by good faith in the US payment system. With 
this kind of currency, the market is more open to speculative exchange both from 
within, and with foreign investors. In the absence of tight regulations on foreign 
investment, entire industries are beat out by foreign competition; such was the case 
with Bethlehem Steel, which contributed to the joblessness problem. The orthodox 
thinker has a problem with large foreign trade deficits because of the value 
depreciation of the currency, which does mean inflation, however we mentioned 
earlier that the heterodoxy does not mind a little inflation, and foreign trade can be 
controlled by policy measures.  
The benefits of a sovereign denominated fiat money are vast, for instance the 
government can make as much of it as they see fit and do not require tax revenue to 
spend it. Under this money system, the government has the power to run up a deficit 
that never has to get paid down. The government’s budget is not like a household 
budget. Conventional wisdom tells us that taxes will eventually be needed to pay off 
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the government debt, but this is false. Taxes are a form of removing reserves from 
the banking system to hit interest rate targets, but it is not the only tactic. When 
trying to manipulate interest rates, the Central Bank will sell bonds that earn more 
interest than reserves to banks in return for their excess reserves. Since banks want 
to sell their excess reserves for higher-earing assets, excess reserves in the banking 
system do not push interest rates below the Central Bank’s target. When the 
government deficit spends, reserves appear in the banking system and get funneled 
right out in return for higher-earning treasury bonds. Hence, treasuries are always 
in demand, the Fed hits their interest rate targets, and the Treasury’s checks never 
bounce. This payment system contributes to the orthodoxy’s perception of a stable 
market, yet many of the capabilities like making budgetary restrictions and taxes all 
but irrelevant remained in the dark to them because of their fixation on inflation. 
We can think about how an orthodox methodological approach, steering the 
economy via keeping inflation low with a tight budget and interest rates for heating 
and cooling, could run the risk of misinterpreting the extent of power sovereign 
denominated floating fiat money. If a government is worried about a budget to the 
detriment of the public good, they are doing a disservice to their constituents and 
their country. As recent attempts to inflate the value of money in Japan and the US 
show, it is impossible to accurately manipulate the relative value of a free-floating 
currency using monetary policy (Wray, 2012). Inflation does not need to be the first 
concern when it comes to government spending, the public good does, thus is the 
value of a floating fiat currency.  
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Sectoral Balances 
 
The Levy Institute’s own Wynne Godly developed a useful method of thinking about 
the macro economy using an accounting identity rather than theory. The sectoral 
balances method rests on something called the flow of funds, the idea that we can 
trace money, trace debt, in order to better understand how the system of finance 
works (Godley & Cripps, 1983). We can think of money as debt either because we 
literally trade in the banks’ liabilities that are backed by the Federal Reserve’s 
liabilities, or simply because when someone spends money someone else 
necessarily receives that money as payment. From this, we can assume a balance 
sheet equation to every transaction because someone’s assets are necessarily 
someone else’s liabilities. Now think about the macro economy as Godley did, in 
terms of three sectors through which money, goods and services flow. The sum total 
of assets and liabilities in the combined public sector, private sector, and foreign 
trade sector always equate to zero because every asset is also a liability. Meaning, if 
the US net imports, as it tends to do, the private and/or public sector must be 
sending dollars abroad. In a country that net exports like China, the private and/or 
public sector must be saving money. Sectoral balances are of the utmost importance 
for modeling the crisis because the private sector was deep underwater in debt, as 
was the foreign trade sector, and the government was adhering to a budget that 
would not balance the scales. What would this mean for the real economy? Due to 
securitization, the bad loans the banks had made were already packaged as assets 
and being traded, however these assets were different in that they were not the 
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liability of anybody in particular. The person with no job no income and no assets 
who received the loan cannot be liable for it. The banks did not feel liable and were 
not worried because they were able to sell the bad assets to unaware investors. 
Banks led the private sector into a hole of debt, while financiers, insurers and real 
estate agents helped distribute it. The US was not going to all of a sudden become a 
net exporter, which left the public sector to balance out the economy.  
The logical question at this point is what did a private sector in debt look 
like? The answer is a little complex and requires a bit deeper understanding of fiscal 
policy, so bear with me. The government spends by crediting the bank account of 
the recipient, which ex-post-facto adds reserves in the banks system. Reserves 
never get lent out; they are a government IOU that backs the banks IOUs, which we 
do withdraw. The government is able to take reserves out of the system via taxation. 
When we write a check to the government for our taxes, the bank takes the amount 
of their own IOUs out of our account, but pays the government for us in reserves. So, 
picture a scenario when the government is not spending, but it is still taxing. 
Reserves are leaving the system faster than they enter. When more assets have 
accumulated than money is entering the system, the private sector’s held assets will 
deteriorate in value (Godley, 2000). In the case of 2007 and 2008, household’s net 
worth depreciated as home values plummeted, and banks were going bankrupt over 
mortgage-backed securities.  
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Financial Innovations and Deregulation 
 
For three decades preceding the crash, a series of economic downswings marked by 
lower investment, higher joblessness, and greater rates of default were each 
followed by a FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) fueled recovery. A 
series of deregulatory statutes passed during the lead-in to the crisis, justified by a 
supposed need to slice the budget and/or repay the deficit. In the wake of 
deregulation, banks saw the opportunity, much like children when their parents are 
away, to do things they were traditionally prohibited from doing. 
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 repealed the post-Great Depression 
legislation that separated commercial and investment banking, which allowed for 
the creation of the all-encompassing financial holdings company whose sheer size 
and investment power could blow bubbles by buying and create voids by selling 
assets.  These monoliths were too-big-to-fail. They had subsidiary companies for off-
book transactions, faulty asset holding and debt packaging. In 2004 the Security and 
Exchange Commission was lobbied into a state of existence that did not live up to 
their mandate to “protect investors and maintain the integrity of the securities 
markets by improving oversight of broker-dealers and providing an incentive for 
broker dealers to implement strong risk management practices” (CNBC, 2012). Even 
so, anything that could have gotten the holding companies in trouble was sure to be 
down the river from the company itself, ensuring the safety of the mother company. 
The financial innovation that would get these companies in trouble was the 
collateralized debt obligation, or CDO for short.  
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Financial institutions’ tactics involved a series of investment techniques that 
resembled nothing short of fraud (Wray, 2016). The finance sector developed the 
habit of lending their assets, firm and household debts, to each other in order to 
finance more investment in the form of loans. The fraudulent packaging of this debt 
involved taking some of the most risky assets, bundling them together in tranches, 
and rating the bundle AAA (as secure as a U.S. Treasury). The process of packaging 
mortgages into CDOs became very profitable because it allowed financial 
institutions to finance, originate, and sell mortgages that would otherwise have been 
blemishes on their balance sheet. With the risk to the loan’s originator bank 
ameliorated, the banks were able to give out what would come to be called “NINJA” 
loans to people with no income, and no job, or assets. The process of creating CDOs 
involved fraudulent activity on the part of financial institutions, ratings agencies, 
debt servicers, accounting firms, trusts, brokers, appraisers, and lenders (Wray, 
2016). Mortgage brokers and real estate agents trying to make a quick buck tricked 
average people into adjustable rate mortgages with interest traps that ensured the 
eventual delinquency on payments. Securities agencies would buy up any and all 
mortgage liens, in order to re-package, take to be rated AAA, and sell them to 
various participating trusts and funds. Meanwhile the same lender that originated 
the malicious loan could purchase what became called a mortgage backed security, 
or MBS, which bet against the loan recipient’s ability to pay. When people began to 
realize what was inside the CDOs, a game of hot potato began between in-the-know 
holders of these worthless assets. Companies like Bear Stern that got caught with 
CDOs on the asset side and MBSs on the liability side of their balance sheet in 2007 
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were forced into bankruptcy. Orthodox thinkers did not foresee the crisis and, in the 
aftermath, thought of it as related to a lapse in the Federal Reserve’s judgment, 
raising the interest rates when they should not have, but under a heterodox 
microscope, financial innovations and deregulation come into focus as causally 
related to the crisis. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 The orthodoxy believed that the financial arena operated under the Fed’s rules, but 
the banks’ subversive tactics and the rapid increase in private debt over a period of 
serious financial deregulation, made it clear to anyone without a significant 
ideological bias that there was nothing but people’s confidence in the Fed stopping a 
debt-driven recession. If the American public were rational actors as the orthodox 
believe, they never would have continued to consume under the conditions of debt 
that were experienced in 2007 and 2008. The public are neither rational, nor are 
they stupid, they are clever to an extent, such that in the midst of bubbling markets, 
people try to ride the bubbles even if it means debt-financing their ride. This type of 
ponzi investment is lauded by the public as incredibly clever, if one manages to ride 
the bubble up and get out, but the exact same behavior is what creates market 
instability because the bubble simply cannot last and someone always get left 
holding the lame duck.  According to Minsky, the downturn was not caused by the 
increase in consumer and household debt, but by an insufficient government budget 
in the midst of lending-happy banks, lulled into a sense of security by stable market 
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conditions (Minsky, 1982, 30). In this section we have discussed multiple measures 
taken to stabilize the economy, from the Fed lowering interest rates, to Congress 
implementing tax-cuts, to financiers packaging debt, all of which failed to prevent 
the recession. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
Citizens and policymakers exist within a set of conditions from which problems can 
and do arise, and occasionally become of crisis proportion—affecting a society as a 
whole. In a democracy, the public and the governors elected or otherwise, solve 
these problems in unison, or rather the public makes its opinion apparent in 
elections, and candidates try to appeal to concerns of a greater public in elections as 
well as during their term. As authors of our own perceptual reality we can choose to 
accept the view of policymaking described above, or since we may be skeptical of a 
constant dialogue between thousands of constituents and any given official, we may 
hope that the governors at least act as they see fit to serve the mass public interest 
that they claim to serve—the ones that got them elected, appointed or otherwise 
involved in governance. A third, even more skeptical positioned thinker, who is less 
inclined to believe in a system of governance that performs as well in practice as in 
theory, feels the need to understand not only whether or not the public’s influence 
in the election process comes to fruition—producing policies that are for the public, 
but also whether or not officials, elected or otherwise, hold the public’s interest in 
consideration at all. It would be foolish to exempt from our conversation, entities 
other than the public that contribute directly to the election and policymaking 
processes.  
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This chapter explores political theories of policy-formation that involve the 
practices of various institutions and actors. We will use multiple theoretical lenses 
to interpret the process of policymaking, while keeping in mind the distinctions 
between orthodox and heterodox economic thinking that was making the financial 
crisis specifically messy. The heterodox specialists’ policy proposals represented 
what was best for the public, although most of the public were not even aware of an 
alternative to orthodox economics. Heterodox solutions like re-segmenting the 
banks and making a federally funded jobs program were distinct from orthodox 
solutions like tax-cuts and capital injections because they were based on the most 
comprehensive explanation of the conditions that led to the financial crisis. Which 
leads back to our question, who did policymakers cater to in 2007 – 2008? The 
public’s interest, policy formation-networks of specialists, elites, interest groups, 
lobbyists, and public opinion are all proposed as answers to our question in our 
political theories. These ideas are easiest to understand in two categories, those 
who believe that the public’s opinion matters to policymaking and those who do not, 
however the intricacies lie in the arguments why. It would be nice to believe that the 
government operated in the interest of the public, but the failure to adopt heterodox 
policy showed the opposite. If public opinion does matter, then the public’s interest 
is either unbeknownst to them, or it is controlled by policy elite, policies themselves, 
or the corporate elite. If the public’s opinion has no sway on policy, it is because 
lobbyists, interest groups, and/or specialists usurp its power. 
This section will discuss theories of who makes our policy. Does the work of 
policy formation-networks, elites, interest groups, lobbyists, government officials, 
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and experts rule the public’s interest out of policy decisions? A few theories suggest 
that this is a possibility. Others report that the public’s opinion is important to 
policy-formation, that the public is myopic and systematically misled by political 
incumbents, or that it is shaped further by the policies themselves. Let us take a 
closer look at the theories of how public opinion shapes policy, and how the authors 
derive their theories. Some believe elite owners of profit-producing assets closely 
involve themselves with policy-formation networks to control policy, while using 
their resources to try to shape public opinion to match their own (Domhoff). 
Another theory is that public opinion matters, but is drowned out by lobbyists, 
interest groups, (Hacker & Pierson). Others claim public opinion matters, but that 
voters are misled and myopic (Bartels). Another theorist finds that public opinion 
matters to policy, but that policy also shapes public opinion (Campbell). Whose 
voice gets the most attention? In the following sections we can get a better 
understanding of what we would expect to see out of legislators if these theorists 
were correct. 
 
The Best of Policy Primeval Soup Fills Windows of Opportunity  
 
Kingdon’s perspective is that Congress chooses the best solutions from a “policy 
primeval soup” made of ideas circulating in specialist groups (Kingdon, 1995). Ideas 
are produced within what Kingdon calls “policy communities” and come to fill 
windows of opportunity in the “political stream”. Imagine, “a community of 
specialists: researchers, congressional staffers, people in planning and evaluation 
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offices and in budget offices, academics, [and] interest group analysts” (Kingdon, 
1995, 116). Ideas are abundant among these groups of specialists, which makes the 
process of narrowing down the list of ideas a long one (Kingdon, 1995, 116). 
Specialists in a specific field bounce ideas off one another. This process could look 
like a conversation over lunch, a published article, hearings where testimony is 
given, or it could involve the trading of actual written legislative proposals 
(Kingdon, 1995, 117). Communities of specialists come in various sizes and degrees 
of fragmentation. Generally those within a smaller, less fragmented community will 
know of each other’s proposals and ideas. Often times, specialists in a tight-knit 
community will make effort to know the main proponent of a prominent idea in 
their field personally (Kingdon, 1995, 117).  This interconnectivity among smaller, 
less fragmented communities tends to lead to common outlooks (Kingdon, 1995, 
119).  A fragmented community of specialists however can produce the opposite, as 
we’ve seen from the orthodox-heterodox debacle.  
Kingdon wants us to think about policymaking in terms of ideas rather than 
in terms of power, influence and pressure, as the political scientist usually would. In 
Kingdon’s account policy communities, upon encountering a problem and related 
ideas, will “argue with one another, marshal evidence and argument in support or 
opposition, persuade one another, solve intellectual puzzles, and become entrapped 
in intellectual dilemmas” (Kingdon, 1995, 125). In the policy communities, 
defensible ideas hold more weight than do lobbying muscle, or the mobilization of 
numbers of people (Kingdon, 1995, 125). The pushers of these ideas are what 
Kingdon calls policy entrepreneurs, people with the means of getting things talked 
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about. Policy entrepreneurs exist within, and outside of, government, in both 
appointed and elected positions, in interest groups, and research organizations. 
Their defining feature is the willingness to invest time and energy in a future policy 
decision. Their reasons for advocating vary greatly from legitimizing campaigns, to 
promoting one’s own values, to the sheer satisfaction of being close to the decision 
makers (Kingdon, 1995, 123). We gather from Kingdon that policy entrepreneurs 
and specialist groups work within a time-window between when their issue takes a 
front-seat and when people lose interest (Kingdon, 1995, 127).  
Now that we are beginning to understand the avenue through which ideas 
become policy proposals, originating in what Kingdon calls the policy primeval 
soup, it is imperative that we look at how the political stream plays a role in forming 
the windows of opportunity through which policy alternatives immerge. An 
administration can have great effect on the policy agenda (Kingdon, 174).  Similarly 
to how problems in the policy stream can open a window for alternatives, events in 
the political stream such as a change of administration, a perceived shift in the 
national mood, or an influx of new policymakers with new ideas can do the same. 
Simply put, the agenda is in check by the constraints of Congress, their 
interpretation of the public mood, ideas about social conditions, and the budget—
the relaxation of any of these constraints offers the possibility of a “window of 
opportunity” for the policy idea.  
Before a policy window ever even opens, policy entrepreneurs are at work 
floating ideas, arguing and reshaping proposals, introducing people to their ideas, 
from the public through specialists and policymakers themselves. It can take years 
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to soften people up enough for them take the idea seriously enough to get it on the 
radar of policymakers (Kingdon, 1995, 143). Apart from needing to be prepared 
years in advance of a problem even appearing on the agenda, policy proposals need 
to be technically feasible, and acceptable in light of values held by the policy 
community (Kingdon, 1995, 143). To be technically feasible, a policy proposal must 
be as completely thought out as possible. It must have a clear measure of 
implementation. Policy makers need to believe that it will work (Kingdon, 1995, 
132). In order to have value feasibility, a policy proposal needs to be coherent with 
policy makers’ values. This means it must align with the proper size and role of 
government, while remaining efficient with government spending and maintaining 
equity among constituents (Kingdon, 1995, 143). This policy community is 
responsible for coming up with the alternatives to the pre-existing conditions from 
which problems arise. 
 In this understanding, a lot of the policymaking process is the seizing of 
opportunities (Kingdon, 1995, 175). Kingdon provides an example from during the 
Ford administration, in which the executive branch called for proposals to reduce 
unemployment. An idea surfaced that would couple unemployment with another 
problem, railroad deterioration, in an attempt to solve both problems with one piece 
of legislation. In this instance, the Ford administration opened a window through 
which transportation specialists offered their solution. This example does well to 
explain how windows emerge, but it does not explain why some policy 
entrepreneurs get their ideas heard while others do not. Kingdon’s explanation is 
that people who can attain a hearing for various reasons, people who are known for 
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their political connections, and those with a dogged determination to push their 
cause will become the policy entrepreneurs.  
While these policy entrepreneurs are important, they are not the only factor 
in policymaking because a force beyond them in the political arena opens the 
windows of opportunity. The entrepreneur’s personalities will be behind the laws 
themselves, which means solutions are not necessarily a product of picking the best 
solution for the public to a given problem, but rather a result of the entrepreneur’s 
effort to soften up the public to the entrepreneur’s own disposition (Kingdon, 1995, 
182). Additionally, policy entrepreneurs face a number of constraints, from the 
ideas formulating in the policy stream, to the political environment which consists 
of perceived constraints on government officials: constitutionality, the budget, the 
mood of the mass public, and limited space on the agenda. These perceived 
constraints lead to a scarcity of windows and predictability of policy outcomes 
(Kingdon, 1995, 207).  
This view of policymaking spares little room for the public’s interest because 
it implies that policy entrepreneurs will push whatever idea benefits them, however 
Congress has a conceptualized version of the public mood in mind as they open and 
close policy windows and select policy solutions. If we accept Kingdon’s theory that 
Congress has the ultimate say, we can allow ourselves to wonder why they did not 
select the heterodox policy solutions that best served the public’s interest.  
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Elites Control Policymaking and Public Opinion 
 
The position this theory takes is that elites control the means of mobilizing the 
public opinion, which crowds out organic public opinion during election time. 
Domhoff argues that there is a power elite group of Americans made up of the 
corporate community and policy-formation organizations, which includes members 
of the upper class and their families on a nationwide in span (Domhoff, 1998, 3). 
These elites come to realize their class and status in attending private institutions, 
and come to see themselves as superior. The upper class derives its status from 
ownership and control of profit-producing instruments such as stocks, bonds and 
real estate (Domhoff, 1998, 116). Elites have an agenda, to maintain the status quo 
and the growth of their fortunes. As a rule, a steadily increasing GDP keeps the 
elites’ assets appreciating, and therefore keeps them happy. Normal policy 
discussion revolves around reaching an agreement between moderate conservative 
elites and ultraconservative elites on how to keep GDP on the up and up (Domhoff, 
1998, 2).  
However, this theory does not propose that public opinion has no sway in 
policy formation. Domhoff thinks public opinion does affect policy formation 
positively and negatively. By this he means, an issue may arise within public opinion 
that engenders a response from political elites, which means politicians are listening 
to constituents, an that public opinion can also constrain government (Domhoff, 
1995, 65). However it is also the case that such influence is limited. For example, 
there are a couple types of promises on campaign trails. A politician may get the 
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popular vote because they promise to push an issue or because they promise to 
oppose something that the public deems fearful. Nonetheless, such moments are the 
exception to the rule. 
This theory has points of intersection with C. Wright Mills theory that the 
political, economic, and military, “power elite” hold a great deal of power and 
influence over society (Mills, 1956; 2000). Mills posits that the power elite 
monopolized wealth, prestige, power, but most importantly they monopolized the 
values held in esteem by society (Mills, 2000, 78). There are policy-formation 
networks that provide participatory advantages to those with the means to access 
them. As a result, not every voice equal and we see it reflected in the legislation. The 
corporate upper class has consistently shaped public opinion by controlling the 
conversation on economic policies and social issues using mass media, polls and 
social consequences for dissent (Domhoff 1998, 185-196). According to this theory, 
the elite are the authority in policymaking. 
 
Lobbyists and Interest Groups Drown Out Public Opinion 
 
Hacker and Pierson contribute to our discussion the theory that lobbyists and 
interest groups have commandeered the role public opinion is supposed to occupy 
in a democracy—informing Congress of the points on which, and ways in which, to 
legislate. Congress’ reliance on lobbyists and interest groups leads to the erosion of 
public opinion and the opinions of specialists operating outside of the lobbying 
firms and interest groups. This theory explains how, even if the public or heterodox 
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specialists were aware of issues relating to the growing crisis, Congress would not 
legislate until the last minute—they were following the prompting of lobbyists and 
interest groups that were leading them in other directions.   
Hacker and Pierson think that economic issues are the most important issues 
the public faces, but that there are not enough lobbyist and interest groups devoting 
effort to solving them. Pushing financial deregulation or tax-cuts are examples of 
things more commonly on lobbyist or interest group agendas. During the Bush 
years, top 1 percent of earners went from taking home 16% of the nations income to 
24% of the nations income (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 19). A series of tax-code 
changes beginning in the 1970s are responsible for a sizable chunk of the 1 
percent’s boost in income (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 49). Tax-cuts are a reoccurring 
theme in policy, appearing in Bush’s Stimulus Bill and Obama’s Reinvestment Act. 
Hacker and Pierson point to two possible causes for passage of policy to make the 
rich richer while the poor stay poor. First, the importance of money in politics was 
increasing, indicated by the doubling in lobbyist spending throughout Bush’s eight-
year term (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 207). Second, public opinion was overshadowed 
by commercial lobbying organizations, and interest groups working closely with 
corporations to influence policy, as shown in the examples of the K Street Project, 
Americans for Tax Reform, and Energy Citizens. Once a group of conservative 
industry associations, Energy Citizens would become the interest super-group when 
united by the American Petroleum Institute. With a name like Energy Citizens, the 
group represents “citizens” while curiously lacking the interests of average citizens 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 144).  
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The authors make the claim that the middle class has been losing political 
ground in terms of: money, participation and knowledge. They cite the decline in 
true grassroots movements and their replacement by astro-turf organizations 
representing average citizens, but lacking average citizen concerns, as a way in 
which the all-encompassing “middle-class” lost their edge in policy-formation. The 
trope that the authors rightly poke a hole in is that average voters’ concerns shifted 
away from material in favor of more moral concerns. In actuality, people still cared 
about economic issues, but interest groups representing average citizens were 
tackling issues that were largely noneconomic in nature.  
Organizations like EMILY’s List, the single largest provider of campaign funds 
for women candidates, were pushing a new-liberal agenda, effectively replacing 
efforts to improve overall economic disadvantages of average citizens with women 
and minority issues (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 145). The loss of economic interest 
groups saw casualties on the right and left. The erosion of grassroots movements for 
middle class citizens made space for a new wave of Christian conservatism. 
Similarly to the left however, the Christian Right focused on moral issues, which led 
to a large group of modest means voters aligned with a party that caters more to the 
wealthy (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 147). The common citizens’ greatest weapons in 
policy formation, their organizations, were fighting over the rights of women, 
minorities, and the environment, instead of guarding against new tax-brackets that 
favored the rich.  
Thus the elite organizations were unabated and unopposed in pushing their 
economic policy. This proved to be a problem because the politicians catering to 
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interest groups, as they naturally should, were not receiving the message that 
middle class citizens were upset about inequality. A majority of middle and lower 
income Americans thought inequality is a bad thing, but their platforms for effecting 
economic policy-formation were occupied, leaving one entity informing economic 
policy: business. The pushes we see towards upper-end tax cuts were largely 
unsupported by popular opinion of middle and lower classes who thought the rich 
did not pay their fair share of taxes already (Bartles, 2008, 140); rather these 
decisions were greatly influenced by commercial lobbying funded by finance big 
shots behind the facades of groups with misrepresentative names (Hacker & 
Pierson, 2011 207). This is Hacker and Pierson’s explanation as to how government 
officials were able to remain unresponsive to the majority of voters and pass 
economic policy that spurred the unprecedented levels of inequality.  
A few anti-tax activist organizations mentioned in Hacker and Pierson’s 
analysis deserve attention. The K Street Project was known for connecting big 
business donors to lobbyists and politicians. The Club for Growth, and Americans 
for Tax Reform were similar organizations funded mostly by large-sum private 
donors, with a more divisive name. These organizations got their reputations from 
years of experience and strategizing to get their issues pushed to the top of 
Congresses’ list. The means by which they did it had everything to do with money 
and elections. The Club for Growth spent $2.3 million in 2003 on Pat Toomey’s 
primary campaign against Republican Senator Arlen Specter. Toomey was running 
on a platform of tax-cuts. Hacker and Pierson propose that this example indicates a 
gradual, systematic process, developed by these organizations, which replacing 
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incumbents with candidates more in tune to the organizations aims (Hacker & 
Pierson, 2011, 209). Americans for Tax Reform adopted the practice of asking non-
incumbents to sign a pledge not to support tax-increases. Soon to win a Republican 
primary, a non- incumbent needed to sign that pledge (Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 
209). These organizations were not mass operations, they were strategic with their 
money and support, and were able to make a significant impact in policy-formation 
by making their opinions seem popular through representation. Once inside 
Congress in numbers, tax-cut representatives got the chance to fulfill their campaign 
promises. Former Republican Speaker of the House Tom DeLay used popular 
support for tax-cuts among incumbent Republicans to the political conversation 
towards one question: tax cuts or no? Incumbents were given two sides to choose 
from when it came time to vote, for, or against the tax-cuts. One might ask why this 
might limit one’s ability to say “no” to policy; doesn’t it make it easier? In the case of 
the financial crisis you’ll remember, the timing of policy decisions were such that 
when it policy was shot down, the market took a hit that destroyed nearly $1.25 
trillion in private assets. Congress formed their opinions based on what they had 
absorbed from experts, taking into account their campaign promises as well. The 
fact that these hits were coming to huge investment companies, which effected 
groups like retirees and investment bankers more than average Americans, was 
blurred over. As we all know, the GOP eventually got their tax cuts. According to 
Hacker and Pierson, Bush Jr. was able to wave goodbye to fiscal conservatism 
because of strengthened advocacy groups and more radicalized Republican caucus 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2011, 217). By setting the agenda of Congress, and essentially 
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delineating ideological terms of a candidate’s election/re-election, advocacy groups 
spoke for the public, but did not actually represent their opinions. That explains the 
advocacy group’s involvement, but what about this Republican caucus? If anything, 
the opinions of the elites came full circle through the policy-formation network, to 
the political dialogue, to the average political observer. People were given the 
decision, Republican or Democrat, but interest groups and lobbyists were calling the 
policy shots. This is Hacker and Pierson’s contribution. 
 
The Misled Myopic Public Matters 
 
Bartels’ theory, like others we discuss, tries to explain the political inequality that 
has erupted over in the last approximately three decades. He begins with an 
explanation of the “New Gilded Age” of rapid economic expansion, partisan conflict 
and political corruption. Economic prosperity is not spread as evenly as it once was. 
Between 1974 and 2005 the income growth of the top 5% earners experienced a 
62.9% growth of cumulative income, whereas the bottom 95% experienced an 
average 25.7% cumulative income growth. To Bartels, the income gap is not just an 
economic inequality problem; it is indicative of a political inequality problem 
(Bartels, 2008, 19). The very ideals of democracy are threatened by this growing 
political and economic inequality (Bartels, 2008, 28). American politics is often left 
out of the discussion of income inequality, but Bartels argues that there is enough 
evidence from policy decisions over the past decade to suggest that there could be a 
political solution. Bartels carefully observes election statistics and finds something 
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peculiar. Republicans get consistently more popular support when a majority of 
voters experience greater economic benefits under Democratic leadership. Figuring 
out the reason behind this phenomenon is Bartels’ puzzle. His answer is multi-stage, 
but can be summarized as such: myopic voters are convinced by income growth 
during election years that the incumbent candidate has done a good job. Election 
year income growth for high-income families is more important to voters on all 
spectrums of the economic ladder. And voters are swayed by the campaign spending 
of incumbents and challengers.  
Archen and Bartels make a similar argument in a later text that we the voters 
are not “sovereign and omnicompetent,” in fact political parties teach voters what to 
think about politics more than we inform the party of our views. Voters are not 
privy to how a candidate acts behind closed doors—we cannot follow them home— 
so judgment is made based largely on a candidate’s public character and how they 
relate to the electorate. A political campaign is less about hearing the people’s voices 
and more about rallying them to vote according to their partisan identities (Archen 
& Bartels, 2014, 311). The campaign tells voters a general party platform, but never 
reveals the candidates’ personal interests and reasons for wanting to hold office. 
Voters are at a loss even when judging incumbents because we are simply not keen 
enough as a species to tell whether our governors did a good or bad job. We should 
reject theories of retrospective accountability upholding good standards in 
democratic government because “they do not portray human beings realistically, 
nor do they take honest account of our human limitations” (Archen & Bartels, 2014, 
306). This theory would have us do away with the folk theory of democracy passed 
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down by Jefferson and the forefathers, as a prerequisite to both greater intellectual 
clarity and real political change” (Archen & Bartels, 2014, 328). 
In this theory, Americans are neither rational actors nor completely dim-
witted, but they can be fooled, which complicates the forefathers visions of 
democracy. Politicians and interest groups, aware of the myopic nature of voters, 
are able to slip in legislation with a time delay, or loosen financial regulations during 
an election year to ensure a growth in income among the richest in society and 
heighten their chance of reelection. Essentially the incumbents awareness of the 
indices voters look to most to determine incumbent success, allowed bad politicians 
to focus only on making those indices look good, regardless of the long-term 
ramifications of twisting the economic cycle to benefit themselves. In this theory, 
the higher-ups recognize the importance of public opinion and take care to leave 
indices of growth where most people check at re-election time to gage economic 
conditions. Bartels is not convinced that voters are swayed exclusively by 
politician’s antics per-se because voters also derive their stance from "misguided 
self-interest” and ideology strategically placed by affluent influences (Bartels, 2008, 
285-88). Similarly to Mills and Domhoff, Bartels thinks the affluent play a role in 
public opinion, but he adds something new as well. Misguided self-interest is how 
Bartels explains the phenomenon of middle-class voters voting for Bush’s tax-cuts 
because they think they themselves pay too much in taxes, not knowing that Bush’s 
tax-cuts were primarily for the rich.  
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Policies Shape Public Opinion 
 
In her book How Policies Make Citizens, Andrea Campbell proposes that public 
policy’s influence on participation directly affects the basic mechanism of 
democratic government. Her theory is informed by data that compared participation 
among welfare recipients, finding that programs providing knowledge resources 
(Medicare) saw higher rates of participation and less social stigma than programs 
that did not provide knowledge resources (Food Stamps). Welfare State policy had 
two vastly different effects on the groups it provided aid to. For veterans and more 
so for the elderly, social programs had a unifying, mobilizing effect. On the other end 
of social policy lie below-poverty-line/unemployment-benefits, which come with a 
stigma that has limited the program’s usefulness in promoting political participation 
among its beneficiaries. Elderly people are able to avoid the widely held public 
stigma that poor and unemployed receivers of government benefits have to face.  
Suzanne Mettler comes to a similar conclusion, that policy influences the 
public’s opinion, in her book Soldiers to Citizens. According to Mettler the G.I. Bill 
was drafted after WWII as a means of dealing with the social issue of how to handle 
the vast amount of veterans returning from overseas. WWI’s veterans caused quite a 
commotion when the “Bonus Army” that appeared at the White House gates 
demanding compensation, had to be driven off by General Douglass MacArthur 
(Mettler, 2007, 17). Thus the G.I. Bill was addressing the interest of government and 
veterans.  It would provide one year of paid schooling, as well as other government 
aid to veterans who served more than six months. To select veterans who displayed 
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a great degree of skill and promise were given four years of education on the 
government. Mettler thinks this select group is another way America’s policy 
favored elitism to equality, or inclusivity (Mettler, 2007, 21). This Bill was made for 
the purpose of quelling another “Bonus Army” type situation, as well as 
transitioning the economy back from wartime to peacetime. In this instance, there 
were disgruntled veterans coming back for sure, but no mob was formed around 
veterans’ rights this time. The G.I. Bill had a great impact on the public’s opinion of 
how veterans are treated in America—obviously better than the WWI. But the bill 
also gave GIs themselves a more positive view of their duties to the government, and 
therefore verifies Campbell’s argument that policy shapes the public it directly 
affects. Mettler and Campbell’s theories explain a similar phenomenon where policy 
is actually shaping the voter, rather than the voter shaping the policy. These two 
thinkers share the idea that policy-making is opinion shaping, this is their 
contribution.  
In her book The Submerged State, Mettler observes the relationship between 
the public and government during the Obama administration as it relates to policy. 
She concludes that people are largely unaware of what policy consists of until they 
are informed after the fact by legislators. A common understanding of democracy 
would suggest that the citizens are active in government, however current 
policymaking practices resemble the opposite. The government actively nudges the 
public to make the decisions the government thinks are best. The issue with voters 
being nudged in policy directions is that as polarization becomes more and more 
apparent and a single source is less and less able to monopolize the media, it 
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becomes harder and harder to get the public’s approval on any piece of legislation 
(Mettler, 2011, 108). Mettler and Campbell’s theories could be instrumental in 
explaining the passage of any of the bills in study because by nonchalantly loosening 
restrictions on financiers and drawing the attention of the public to largely non-
economic issues, earlier administrations had shaped a public that inadvertently 
accepted an orthodox economic perspective that monetary policy could solve the 
problems of unemployment and increasing private debt. Loosening restrictions to 
increase banks’ earning potentials gave financiers all the more reason to trust and 
participate more actively in government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to equip the reader with a few interpretations 
of the policymaking process in order to see the various kinds of actors each author 
exemplifies as key, so that we may later make our own judgments about who was 
behind the policy decisions in 2007 and 2008. Kingdon believes that ideas are 
brought by policy entrepreneurs through windows opened by political forces that 
are constricted by the public mood. Domhoff and Mills think there are a 
policymaking elite who control policy via control over elections and public opinion, 
and whose goal is to maintain the status quo and grow their wealth. Hacker and 
Pearson suggest that lobbyist and interest groups have usurped public interest and 
public opinion. Bartels and Archen tells us that voters, while being essential to the 
election and therefore policymaking process, are neither the rational actors nor 
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always aware of their best interest, but believe what they are told and are quick to 
forget. Campbell and Mettler inform us of the possibility that policy itself could 
influence the policymaking process by shaping the public’s attitudes towards 
conditions of society. These concepts will guide us as we explore policymaking 
under the most extreme conditions during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Case Study 
 
Stimulus Bill 
 
The Economic Stimulus Act was the Bush administration’s parting gift, passed in 
early February 2008, as Bush’s final term came to a close. The “Stimulus Bill,” for 
short, gave tax rebates on the first $6000 of individuals earned income and $12000 
of couples earned income with a cap at $600 per individual and $1200 per couple, 
with an additional $300 per child. The minimum rebate for taxpayers with earned 
income above $3000 per year was $300 for individual and $600 for couples (Pelosi, 
2008). The Stimulus Bill also increased the government’s expensing allowance for 
buying depreciable business assets to a quarter of a million dollars. It also raised the 
ceiling on the maximum priced mortgage originated between July 2007 and 
December 2008 that could be bought and securitized by the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). It made a loan limit increase for people with FHA-
insured mortgages in wealthy neighborhoods, so long as they filed before December 
2008. It granted the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development power to raise 
loan limits anywhere he saw fit, so long as he provided a report within thirty days 
prior. 
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As early as 2001, the economy was showing signs of a deep recession on the 
horizon, at least to anyone checking a simple indicator like the sectoral balances 
(Godley & Izurieta, 2001). It was not until January of 2008 however, that the 
Government decided to address the issue directly via government spending—fiscal 
policy. Very broadly, Bush’s stimulus bill took effect in four sectors of the economy. 
Some benefits went to households firms in the form of rebates, but a majority went 
to to banks and government agencies. If we take a heterodox perspective of the $168 
billion in government stimulus, the smallest portion went to the most integral piece 
holding together the economy. In an accountability crisis, less than a quarter of 1% 
of the total funds reached those departments responsible for holding corporate 
lenders accountable. Aside from perhaps realizing the underlying problem of 
stability breeding instability and not doing enough about it, Bush’s stimulus did 
some good. It proved the depth of the government’s pocket, signaled a movement 
away from relying on monetary policy and orthodox principles, and should have 
stifled the fiscal conservatives claiming we would have to pay it back in taxes later. 
There is no simple way of saying that this bill, and this moment in history, changed 
the way we see stimulus and subvert economic crises. The whopping 1,071-page bill 
in all its complexity appears to have been designed for us not to be able to read 
into—for the public not to understand—but that is exactly why it needs a thorough 
explanation. Keeping in mind our overarching questions and divergent political 
interpretations of policymaking, Congress may be keen to public opinion, acting in 
the interest of the public, or on behalf of various elites, lobbyists, interest groups, or 
policy entrepreneurs.  
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 The Stimulus Bill stood out in an era of polarization and party dissonance as 
a shining example of Congress agreeing. The bill passed with 380 – 34 yea and nay 
in the House and 81 – 16 votes for and against in the Senate. The bill went from 
initial discussions in congress and was passed in less than four weeks. Congress 
provided the public the semblance of a functioning policy making system, amidst a 
talk of the polarization-induced dysfunction of the parties. On January 11th 2008, 
Sen. Harry Reid and Speaker Nancy Pelosi reached out to President Bush in a public 
letter expressing their intent to work with Bush on a “legislative plan… that injects 
demand into the economy, restores consumer confidence and purchasing power, 
and addresses the sever strains being felt by millions of our fellow Americans” 
(Pelosi, 2008). Meanwhile, a day after Pelosi and Reid’s letter, Sen. Chuck Schumer 
made a radio address warning people of the Bush administration’s “do nothing 
approach as our nations housing crisis escalates, failing to come to grips with the 
escalating home foreclosures and devastating loss in home equity caused by the 
subprime mortgage crisis” (Pelosi, 2008). The Senate heard the real problems with 
no sugar coating, and chose certain solutions. If Congress had accepted the necessity 
of fiscal policy, they had already abandoned a purely orthodox line of thinking, but 
they did not go to the heterodox specialists and instead chose to rely on recently 
orthodox ex-financiers’ advising.  
 The Stimulus Bill had three major stipulations: giving aid to the low income 
workers and their families, raising the limit on the size mortgage that could be 
purchased by the government subsidiary companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack, 
and incentivizing business expansion. We mentioned earlier that policy is 
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formulated from ideas, and ideas address issues so allow us to first grapple with the 
root. Low aggregate-demand and rising unemployment were almost eclipsed by a 
more immanent issue—the housing market bubble. Secretary of Treasury Hank 
Paulson was worried about the devastating effects a housing market downturn 
would have on the economy and his reputation. His position in office, and the 
positions and reputations of many other elected officials were on the line in the face 
of this economic crisis. Offshoots of the collapsing housing bubble problem, mainly 
the possibility that this downturn could affect the entire economic spectrum of 
constituents, made this a political issue of great importance. A heterodox 
understanding would say the housing bubble is built on debt due to a lack of 
adequately paying jobs. Short of the heterodox proposal to create federally funded 
jobs, setting prices on necessities, providing free healthcare, or free college 
education, giving everyone a check for $300 was the best option. The sarcasm brings 
much needed humor to a devastating realization, this was not the best, or the next 
best option; the Stimulus Bill was a Band-Aid for the public and loosened 
regulations on finance. Congress acted, in unison, in the interest of elites. To find out 
why these solutions and not others made it onto the ticket, we need to look to the 
political actors who made their ideological presence the predominant solution to 
the issue. 
 In our search for pivotal actors in the Stimulus Bill, we must observe the bills 
main proponents, House Leader John Boehner, Senate Leader Nancy Pelosi, Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid, and Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson, all of whom 
held advantaged bureaucratic positions sufficient to put their constituents, their 
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party’s, their backers’, or their own ideological mark on the bill. Boehner was the 
newly elected replacement for Tom Delay who had stepped down due to 
accusations of money laundering had forced to step down. Boehner could have been 
expected to represent the fiscal conservatives, meaning tight-budget runners, and 
efficient market believers, but he was sailing in disturbed waters where his options 
were pre-defined. He could throw the proverbial buoy to the sinking CEO’s, or let 
them drown in the leaky boat they had made for themselves. A few clues as to why 
he chose the CEOs over old fiscal conservative values include: corporate money ties 
to the party, actual fear of the spread of economic consequences on account of 
Paulson’s predictions, all tied together with his hopes of re-election as a 
congressman, but also as Speaker of the House.  
Market hemorrhaging was visible from privileged positions in Washington 
because Paulson had access to the banks cooked books and, although too slowly and 
cautiously, revealed the information he had to Congress. Corruption was visible and 
ripe to take advantage of from privileged positions in Washington and Wall Street. 
Party to the bank and firm CEOs’ syndicates was every member of Congress with a 
voice, not advocating for stricter regulation. The ideas heard on the floor and in the 
discussion rooms were predominantly the aforementioned individuals’, or those of a 
like mind, barring the occasional Bernie Sanders.  
 Pelosi spoke in interviews as if the Democrats were the patron saints of the 
middle class, but inside must have known that the bill was too little too late for a 
suffering middle economy. Pelosi was familiar with finance and corruption having 
served as Chair of the Campaign Finance Committee in 2006. She consciously lied to 
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the public in her own interest while supporting the private interests, introducing 
the 2008 Stimulus Bill as a “gift to the middle class” (C-SPAN, 2008). She relied on a 
misled and myopic voting populace, but anyone actually observing the allocation of 
resources could tell that the financiers won Congress’s allegiance.  
 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid also spoke for the Democratic Party, and 
had this to say about the Stimulus Bill, “Legislation is the art of compromise, and 
that compromise comes very hard sometimes, and it came very hard this time” (C-
SPAN, 2008). Democrats told the public that they did not get as much benefit for the 
middle class as they had hoped, but they were looking for the wrong kinds of 
solutions altogether. Republicans would not have liked big handouts to taxpayers, 
but how big could Reid have initially proposed to hand out? He said he talked with 
Secretary of Treasury Paulson who told him the things they could and could not do. 
Paulson knew, so Reid must have known, the Treasury, or rather the Fed’s unlimited 
spending power. One explanation why, is the fact that it was not the Senate, but the 
House that proposed this bill. The issue being confronted was the insider banks and 
too-big-to-fail institutions folding under with packaged debt. 
 Paulson played a prominent role in this piece of legislation, but definitely 
should not have been in charge of leading the way out of the recession because he 
had an orthodox understanding of the economy that was unequipped to deal with 
the issues at hand. He also definitely did not hold the interest of the public very 
highly because in 2006, Secretary Paulson put forward a very impersonal, evasive 
and truly scary ideology toward the relation of the market to politics by attributing 
income inequality to “market forces” as if the government cannot have a hand in the 
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market (Bartels, 2008). Over the next two years, Paulson would begin singing a 
different tune as he tried to use his powers to gently lift the economy, resulting 
much like lifting a handful of dry sand—saving some and leaving most behind.   
In an address to the nation on January 24, 2008, President Bush assured the 
public that his Stimulus Bill was,  
“An effective, robust and temporary set of incentives that will boost 
our economy and encourage job creation… [It] has the right set of 
policies and is the right size… will lead to higher consumer spending 
and increased business investment… recognizes that lowering taxes is 
a powerful and efficient way to help consumers and businesses… not 
include any tax increases” (Bush, 2008).  
Despite these claims, after the fact, the total $168billion stimulus proved to be less 
of a boost than needed, and also happened to be allocated in strange places. In both 
Republican and Democrat accounts, Bush’s Stimulus Bill failed to more than weakly 
improve the economy. Where the parties differed was their interpretation of the 
nature of its failure. The right held that stimulus was an ineffective measure, as it 
added to the deficit and did not produce results. The left maintained that the 
stimulus saw results in the real economy proportional to the size of the stimulus 
package; the size was simply not large enough. Not a single Republican came around 
for the next act of stimulus under the Obama administration, expressing their 
displeasure for deficit spending (Blinder, 226). According to the left, the bill was still 
relying too heavily on trickle-down economics, a highly contested, yet still 
supported, orthodox way of thinking. Giving businesses tax breaks inevitably leads 
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to business executives taking home bigger paychecks, but will not necessarily lead 
to job creation. The provisions of the bill were: small tax rebates for lower income 
households, tax incentives for businesses, and increased the price of mortgage the 
government’s entities could purchase (Blinder, 224). Notice, this act provided one 
small provision for households and blessed the sectors of finance (specifically 
traders in derivatives), real estate and insurance. The blow these markets took were 
notably less than predicted, on account of the government’s intervention. To put it 
in comparison in real terms, a lot of middle and lower income taxpayers got a small 
rebate check in the mail, while corporate participants in speculative and ponzi 
trading on the fringe of legality had their companies saved by the government 
dollar. Republicans and Democrats alike agreed to Paulson’s advice to provide more 
support for criminal bankers than for those they affected. 
 It is clear that heterodox ideas were never really on the table. Instead 
Congress chose the idea put forward by countless business interest groups and 
lobbyists—tax cuts—as was also fashionable in orthodox circles at the time. The 
appeal of tax cuts rode on unenlightened self-interest—handing out chump change, 
and riding off with most of the money (Bartels, 2008). The Democrats went with it 
and tried to add a sizeable refund to taxpayers, but were stunted by compromise 
Republicans who became very tight budget at the first utterance of welfare. The 
eclipsing issue of the housing market was not to be solved either, but merely pushed 
to the next administration to deal with because the increased purchasing power of 
Fannie Mae only spurred the sale of mortgage backed securities. At the end of the 
day, tax-cuts were not the same as the steady income jobs provide. From its context 
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at the beginning of the crash we know the Stimulus Bill failed to prevent the disaster 
to come. What can this policy tell us about the policy-making processes? It will serve 
as our basis, for understanding whether or not policymakers act in the interest of 
the public or other interest, whether the public’s opinion matters at all in 
policymaking. Keeping in mind our overarching questions, let us to briefly draw 
upon our political theorists. If Mettler and Campbell are correct that policy influence 
citizens, and public opinion matters to policymaking, this failed policy should 
produce a significant change in approach seeing as it cause significant public and 
political backlash to the potency of tax-cuts. The question of public influence aside, it 
is clear from the Stimulus Bill alone that private interests and lobbyists from a 
booming financial services industry led by elite bankers had a role in policy 
decisions. 
 
Stabilization Act 
 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was the Obama administration’s 
first stab at the issue of the housing market. It consisted of two sections, the first 
devoted to the housing market crisis, the second to energy independence. The 
course of action for dealing with the housing market consisted of delegating to the 
Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson the job of purchasing securitized assets from 
banks. There was a committee formed to check Secretary Paulson’s results and 
Paulson was regularly required to report his actions to Congress. Other than the 
reports, Paulson was to be the unchecked voice of the public interest. The state of 
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the economy in 2007 and 2008, when this bill was in the makings, made this bill one 
of the most important decisions Congress would make. The decision to bail out 
finance industry came out of necessity on account of the banks interconnectedness 
in their risky practices. The same securities Paulson had tried to take care of months 
earlier by subsidizing Fannie Mae had come back to bite him, yet he was still who 
Congress looked to for solutions. Secretary Paulson was given the power to 
essentially legitimate the crappy packaged debt banks were pretending had value. 
He essentially gave banks the power to create endogenous money by lending, a 
power once thought to have been restricted by a money multiplier of a bank’s Fed-
allotted reserves. The policymaking process was not only the most drawn out of the 
policymaking processes in study, but it gave the most power to a single individual 
than any other case in study, and it resulted in the most significant extension of 
power to non-governmental agencies, and returned almost pre-Great Depression 
market conditions. The Stabilization Act was a complete retreat to monetary policy 
and orthodox understandings of the economy. The government would put money in 
the failing banks and let it trickle down—raise the money supply to raise aggregate 
demand—sure in a functioning invisible hand orthodox model, but we are talking 
about clever and greedy Americans. The banks only needed money because their 
assets making up most of the financiers recently made fortunes had gone to shit 
because the banks themselves had originated them in shit. By saving the banks, 
policymakers were neither listening to the heterodox specialist who saw all of it 
coming, nor representing the public who were fed up with bailouts for greedy 
banks.  
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Division A of the Stabilization Act would come to be called the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). Title I of the TARP encouraged the secretary to “designate 
financial institutions as financial agents of the federal government,” as well as, 
“establish vehicles to purchase, hold, and sell troubled assets and issue obligations” 
(H.R. 1424, Sec 101). Title II of Division A of the Stabilization Act exempted Paulson 
from budgetary restrictions. Title III protected buyers or sellers of preferred stock 
in investment companies receiving tarp though tax provisions. It also denies 
executive benefits for companies benefitting from the TARP. 
The story of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act actually began with a 
memo, which turned into a program proposal, which turned into a bill and was then 
signed into law, with congressional approval, by President Bush. This took place 
over the span of about seven months, including a four-month period when Congress 
was inactive on the matter. The initial memo was proposed to Congress less than a 
month after Bush’s Stimulus bill was enacted. The Troubled Asset Relief Program’s 
(TARP) inception came as a hasty response to the Bear Sterns rescue, prompted by 
Treasury Secretary Paulson’s rather rational fear that a financial meltdown could be 
at hand (Blinder, 177). Paulson brought in two men, Phillip Swagel, an economist, 
and Neel Kashkari, an investment banker from Goldman Sachs, to draft a memo for 
governmental action to save the economy in the event of a financial meltdown 
(Blinder, 178). What the team came up with boiled down to four possible solutions, 
two of which would remain as staple provisions of the TARP. The government could 
either: buy toxic assets, guarantee toxic assets, inject capital directly into banks, or 
refinance home mortgages (Blinder, 179). TARP would later allow the government 
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to buy toxic assets on bank balance sheets, and inject money directly into the banks, 
essentially through government spending. When it came time to propose the 
program to Congress, the proposal requested the most money any program had ever 
asked for, and was only three pages long (Blinder, 185). Paulson’s proposal asked 
for $700billion of public money, to be allocated by the Secretary of the Treasury (his 
own position at the time) as seen fit to ensure the stability of the financial system. 
Blinder adds that Paulson’s clause disallowing judicial review, “was an incredible 
departure from the way we do business in the United States, and it didn’t get in 
there by accident” (186). The banks failing during Paulson’s term would have 
looked bad, but Paulson also must have seen the chance to help likeminded financial 
big shots in way over their head in private debt and trying to keep their retirement 
fund growing through investment.  
The Stabilization Act passed with a 268 - 148 majority in the House and 74 – 
25, yeas to nays in the Senate. Congress was divided over the strategy for economic 
intervention with both Right and Left offering distinct critiques, although let us be 
clear the bill’s core ideas were already set when it was accepted to be proposed in 
March of 2007. It is hard to imagine, but all signs show that the attention of 
Congress was captured by an idea proposed by Paulson and his team—the window 
of opportunity was already blocked with a bunk idea, such that the heterodox 
alternatives never got a chance to be heard. A proposal of this costliness, carving 
into the deficit no less, should have faced serious scrutiny by every member of 
Congress, but especially the House and Senate Republicans. It would seem due to 
the votes however, that tight budget fiscal conservatism would not have the day, at 
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least under the circumstances. With the Democrats controlling Congress, Paulson 
should have been forced to comply with them, but it was ultimately Paulson’s plan. 
Democrats wanted to use the opportunity to address the issue of executive pay. 
Democrats on the far left saw inequality as an issue, and tried to seize the moment 
to check the greedy executives; banks were on one leg and needed the government’s 
help. Paulson, along with his backers in the Federal Reserve System, Geithner and 
Bernanke, strongly advocated that executive pay be left in tact because they wanted 
companies to participate in TARP without stigma (Blinder, 188-189). Their fear was 
that if the banks looked weak accepting the plan, poor market expectations would 
drive a slow recovery. The public wanted equality and repercussions for greed-
driven risk-taking in the financial sector. Instead of the banks receiving the stigma of 
being weak, the public saw participants in the TARP as greedy bankers accepting 
government bailout to cover for their own risky dealings (Blinder, 190). The 
example of TARP shows the members of government who are democratically 
elected, looking to Paulson, an appointed administration member, instead of 
specialists on financial crises, and without taking into account the public’s 
dissatisfaction with bailouts.  At the same time, the control the Treasury Secretary 
would wield through the fiscal provisions of TARP gave rise to concern over 
Paulson’s unchecked power, with key Democrats pushing for more oversight. So, it 
is not as if there are not any congress-people trying to better represent the people, 
there are simply not enough to outweigh those who go with the flow of privately 
interested ideas.  
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The result of Republican and Democrat horse-trading was a piece of 
legislation that allocated an absurd amount of power to a single individual and did 
not have the public’s approval (Blinder, 191). This piece of legislation held no more 
than a façade of public interest; it was really all for Paulson and the banks.  Paulson 
was the voice of the business elite in government, a position primed for Paulson by 
lobbyists and business interest groups, lining politician’s pockets for years. Despite 
the Democrats attempts, the final product still gave Paulson power to allocate 
billions of government dollars with few provisions on executive pay. A provision 
created the Congressional Oversight Panel, chaired by Elizabeth Warren, was added 
to the TARP along with some other supervisory requirements. However, these 
supervisory roles were just that - supervisory, meaning that while they watched 
Paulson, and later Geithner, they lacked regulatory bite. Paulson was bolstered with 
a clause that allowed the Secretary of Treasury to purchase any financial instrument 
necessary, after consulting with the chairman of the Federal Reserve to maintain 
financial market stability.  
Perhaps due to this unsatisfactory settlement, the legislative path that the 
Bill took was a bumpy one. The TARP was included in the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, which passed Congress, but not before it was shot down 
on September 29th by a combination of over two-thirds of House Republicans and a 
slightly smaller proportion of the Democratic Left. The very next day however, the 
S&P 500 took a 9 percent hit, destroying private wealth equivalent to almost twice 
what TARP had requested, scaring Congress more than Paulson’s bill (Blinder, 193). 
While Congress voted the Act into law, administrative game plans were changing. 
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Paulson came to believe that capital injections, Bernanke’s weapon of choice, would 
be far more manageable than buying toxic assets. Upon receiving advice from his 
senior press officer Michelle Davis, Paulson did not reveal to congress that they 
were voting on a bill, more than half of which was about buying toxic assets, which 
Paulson no longer intended to make his primary course of action. “As a result, in 
early October 2008, the United States Senate and House of Representatives voted to 
inject capital into banks while thinking it was voting to purchase ‘troubled assets,’ 
including lots of home mortgages” (Blinder, 193). Instead Paulson would use his 
new powers to buy shares in companies lacking capital equity.  
 Cash injections were not bailouts—except that they were, they were actually 
the beginning of a new plan devised by Paulson and Bernanke that was a reversion 
to what resembled monetary policy—quantitative easing. There were two points at 
which the public were considered during the TARP’s creation, the beginning belief 
that the bank’s failures could affect the public, and the notion that the public needed 
to think the markets were strong. Constrained by neither of these considerations, 
the former investment bankers Paulson and Bernanke were allowed to make the 
decisions they saw fit to help the banks.   
 Once again Congress took the advice of the finance lobbyists and interest 
groups that funded the campaigns of so many elected officials. Even members of the 
cabinet with appointed positions spoke out in support of the same orthodox—let 
the invisible hand fix it—attitude. It was as if an elite group of finance businessmen 
had control of the legislating process. But they did it in such a way that left the 
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public believing for the most part that they were saved, perpetuating their electoral 
blind spot and pushing negative thoughts about the economy out of mind.  
 
Reinvestment Act 
 
On January 6, 2009 Sen. Harry Reid introduced the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act to Congress with a clear set of objectives. These objectives called for 
legislative action to produce jobs, restore economic growth and strengthen 
America’s middle class in ways that: modernize the nations infrastructure, increase 
energy independence, expand educational opportunities, provide and improve 
affordable health care, give tax relief, an protect those greatest in need (Senate.gov, 
2009). A whole month, eleven days and 41 roll calls for Congressional votes later, 
the Reinvestment act passed amidst a gridlocked Congress with only a 244 – 188 
majority in the House and 61 – 34 yeas to nays in the Senate. 
In 2009, the state of the economy was even worse. The unemployment rate 
steadily climbed through 2007 and 2008. Private sector debt followed suit. It was 
time for another government bailout. The question was whether Obama was going 
to take a different angle than previously. The Reinvestment Act took a similar 
trajectory to the Stimulus Bill, in that experts played the leading role in creating it, 
but differed in that the funds it freed were delegated to more experts in more 
divisions to distribute. The issue Congress was addressing was arguably still the 
dragging market exemplified by the growing indebtedness of the nations foreign 
and private sectors, although the mood had changed slightly from the Bush years. 
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The Obama administration focused on the job market, trying to plug holes in the 
leaky economy instead of just bailing, although they did that too. Money went to 
government-affiliated agencies in the service of: Highway, Bridge & Transit, Water & 
Waste Water Infrastructure, Renewable & Clean Energy, Education, Workforce 
Development, Law Enforcement, Firefighter Assistance, and Economic and 
Community Development.  
 Highway, Bridge & Transit received over $48 billion, Water & Waste Water 
Infrastructure received $6.4 billion, Renewable & Clean Energy received $16.8 
billion, Education Programs received over $150 billion, Workforce Development 
received $4 billion, Law Enforcement received $4 billion, Firefighters received $210 
million and Economic and Community Development received around $3 billion in 
federal grants (Gillibrand, 2009). Some of the most notable distinctions between 
Obama and Bush’s stimulus packages were that the Stimulus Bill was republican 
populism, tax-cut oriented; and the Recovery Act was democrat populism, 
employment oriented. The Stimulus Bill put the money in the hands of the 
businesses and taxpayers, while the Recovery act put the money in the hands of the 
experts in the interest of the public, however neither option produced the aggregate 
demand stimulus, or job growth 
Obama inherited a lot of responsibility from President Bush, including 
appointing a new Secretary of Treasury to replace Paulson, who would complete the 
trifecta with Obama and Bernanke responsible for nursing the economy back to 
health. As it turns out, filling the spot of Treasury Secretary was the least of his 
worries; greatest of all would be getting everyone on board with another round of 
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stimulus. Obama filled his open roster spot with Timothy Geithner, the former 
investment banker and chair of the New York Fed. The real issue Obama faced was 
overcoming the assumptions and misconceptions Congress and the public had 
regarding stimulus of the economy. Obama offered more of a heterodox posture 
toward economic stimulus that Bush lacked. Under this view, economic stimulus 
had to come from both equity in the banks and aggregate demand on the level of 
consumers. Bush’s stimulus had not reached consumers effectively because it relied 
upon earned income tax deductions, which not everyone makes enough to pay. 
Everyone does need to eat. Obama wanted tax-cuts to reach people who paid payroll 
taxes as well (Blinder). Another issue facing the team trying to save the nation’s 
economy was the rapid loss of jobs. To remedy this Obama planned to put funds 
towards infrastructure. A third issue was the State and local governments slashing 
of payrolls and raising of taxes. To solve this problem Obama proposed providing 
stimulus to State governments as well.  
Republicans took issue with every solution: payroll tax-cuts were welfare, 
funding infrastructure was more government spending, and aiding state and local 
governments would not stimulate the economy. However, the real issue was that 
Obama was fighting an uphill battle with Republicans, as well as the American 
people, given the context within which the Bill was offered. Bush’s TARP had left a 
bad taste in voters’ mouths, and Republicans were coming away with large 
concessions for refusing to comply with Obama’s stimulus plans (Blinder, 227). The 
largest concession to the Republicans came with the slashing of the New Jobs Tax 
Credit section of Obama’s stimulus. The plan would have effectively lowered the 
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cost, to businesses, of hiring new employees, but it faced harsh criticism from both 
business groups who wanted cash injections instead of tax cuts, and Republicans. 
This was the story for a great deal of the Recovery Act’s passing. By February 17, 
2009, the bill was two-thirds tax-cuts, and one-third new spending (Blinder, 232).  
The budget deficits incurred by Obama’s policy and the hasty overprotection of the 
stimulus’s effectiveness would come to tarnish the Recovery Act’s name in the eyes 
of the public (Blinder, 235)  
 
Analysis 
 
Now, using our knowledge of the two schools of thinking about the of the crisis, and 
our multiple perspectives for understanding policymaking, allow us to re-examine 
the three pieces of legislation and try to interpret why some ideas were chosen 
above others as policy solutions. The Stimulus Bill addressed the problem of low 
demand via tax cuts. The Stabilization Act addressed the problem of the banks 
failing through the purchase of toxic assets. The Reinvestment Act addressed the 
problem of a dragging economy, joblessness, and a lack of aggregate demand, 
though government spending on infrastructure. The years 2007 and 2008 were 
trying times for our nation, its people, and its policymakers. These three policy 
solutions may have saved us from a Great Depression level crash, but they each 
indicated origins in an orthodox understanding of the economy, and therefore could 
not diagnose problem, as it was, an instance of finance, real estate, and insurance 
syndicalism that was short-circuiting capitalism. Despite all the knowledge 
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heterodox specialists put forward in diagnosis of the crisis, as it related to the 
adherence to nominal budgetary constraints, lack of attention to sectoral balances, 
and deregulation-fueled innovation, policymakers did not address these issues in 
any direct manner. The successive failures to head off further market deterioration 
made the heterodox understanding of economic crisis appealing, both to specialists 
and the members of the public who chose to study the crisis, however our study 
makes clear that policy decisions were out of the hands of heterodox specialists and 
the public. Elections do not produce a responsive government, and the specialists 
with the best ideas are not always received well by policymakers. Each Act in study 
can be thought of as created in a bubble, in that the policymakers in Washington 
operated completely on their own, grounded only by their interpretation of the 
constraints.   
 The Stimulus Bill featured a business-first attitude that was indicative of 
interest group infiltration of the policymaking process. We could point to a number 
of causes for tax cuts instead of regulation. For starters, tax cuts were a Republican 
trick of the trade, immortalized by previous Republican administrations, against the 
grain of fiscal conservatism. The specific brand of orthodox thinking this Act is akin 
to, called supply-side economics, originating in the Regan era, would lead one to 
believe that to spur the economy, one need only reduce the taxes and regulations. 
We could point to groups like the Business Roundtable, still projecting great 
economic health as late as Q2 of 2007, directly implanting the orthodox, business-
elite way of thinking into Washington. How does one fix the problem of low 
aggregate demand if they believe the business lobbyists and interests groups? 
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Exactly how the Bush administration handled it—do almost nothing—let the all-
powerful invisible hand fix the kinks. Many of Bush’s decisions lead us to place him 
in the category of an orthodox economist, for example he appointed a former CEO 
Hank Paulson as Secretary of the Treasury, and appointed former financial 
malpractice corporate defense lawyer Harvey Pit to lead government financial 
regulation as head of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Republican 
Party already thought like the orthodoxy, and the Democratic Party succumbed to 
the financiers providing election platforms despite trying to uphold their image as 
representatives of a middle class interest (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Therefore 
Congress too was colored orthodox. No regulations were going to come from a 
group of orthodox-thinking policymakers who were neither constrained by 
accountability to the public nor intent on maintaining the health of the economy 
using the most contemporary, comprehensive solutions. This is how we can explain 
the defunct policy solution choices made in 2007.  
 The Stabilization Act served the very same business elite that had created the 
conditions of the crisis—relieving failing institutions of the toxic assets originated 
and accumulated by the banks themselves. This bill had nothing to do with the 
public’s interest, as it was actually helping those who had got the public into the 
financial mess. Yes, the public had money tied up in these institutions, but a policy 
response in favor of the public would pay out the misguided public, or legislatively 
end the practices of malicious loans, debt packaging for higher security ratings, and 
off-balance-sheet transactions. Despite the attempt at a top down revival of the 
economy, the people wound up paying for the mistakes of banks and governments 
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when the policy response failed resuscitate the markets. A policy to protect the 
people would have had banking regulations attached, and this Act did not. Why so? 
Let us not forget we are dealing with a similar congress, loyal to the financiers, and 
the same Fed Chairman Bush had appointed, Ben Bernanke, but under a new 
administration. Obama appointed a Secretary of Treasury not so deeply rooted in 
big business, Timothy Geithner, but his former position at the Federal Reserve put 
him in the same boat as other orthodox thinkers making him unlikely to impose 
restrictions on the banks. What Obama could not have known was that Geithner 
would make a grab for power in the TARP and ensure the lucrative financial system 
stayed in tact so that he could go on to manage private equity funds after office. 
While we cannot be sure if Obama would have chosen a bailout that disregarded the 
wellbeing of the public, we can be sure that Congress and the appointed members of 
finance related divisions of the administration had a significant majority of the 
leverage in the policy formation process. This is how we can explain the downright 
criminal policy solution choices made in early 2008.  
 The Reinvestment and Recovery Act spent most of the large budget on 
infrastructure and various state departments, and only a small portion went to 
workforce development. This Act, more so than the others, gave priority to creating 
jobs, but it should not be mistaken with acceptance of heterodox policy proposals. 
The Heterodoxy wanted to see federal jobs programs. Studies show that the 
Recovery Act was more successful at creating jobs in the public sector than the 
private sector, which calls into question how reliable letting the private sector make 
their own jobs (Dupor, 2014). Less than a quarter of jobs created by the Recovery 
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Act after one year were in the private sector, yet seven out of every nine employed 
Americans have jobs in the private sector (Dupor, 2014). Despite a Democratic 
majority in Congress, the filibuster required the Act had Republican swing votes to 
pass. It is no coincidence however that cuts on earned income tax were the first 
thing the Democrats conceded. At the root, both Republicans and Democrats were 
still loyal to the private interests before the interests of the public. This Act was 
another grab at power, although this time less centralized. Government powers 
were increased, but not how they should have been—over banks and financial 
institutions—instead government’s power increased on account of spending 
potential. Although this Act was supposed to be a jobs creation measure of fiscal 
policy, the money spent was not all in service of creating jobs. Apart from by the 
federal agencies, there was no telling how the money would be spent. Of the $787 
billion spent on the Recovery Act, $212 billion was on tax cuts (Boone et al. 2014). 
Following Bush’s administration’s failed attempt at raising aggregate demand with 
tax cuts, Obama’s administration puts forth a bill that is one-third tax cuts. The 
control of policymaking never left the hands of those few critical Congress people 
and appointed members of finance related divisions of the administration. This is 
how we can explain the reappearance of faulty tactics in 2008. 
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Conclusion 
 
We want to come away with a few things; first that policymaking goes on 
above the heads and beyond the consideration of all but a tiny percent of people 
involved in policy formation networks, and second that appeasing the people comes 
as an afterthought to pleasing the private interests. In explanation of these 
conditions we have proposed that elites, policies, lobbyists, and interest groups each 
played a role in distracting policymakers and the greater public from the important 
work and warnings of heterodox economists. While everyone except heterodox 
thinkers were distracted, conditions went from crisis to crash in 2007. As 
policymakers scurried to find solutions, they never checked with heterodox 
specialists whose proposals to fix the unstable market conditions were in circulation 
for years prior to 2007 – 2008.  If Kingdon’s theory that policies are chosen based on 
the merit of the ideas put forward by specialist groups, than we would have likely 
seen heterodox policies emerge from the policymaking process. The policies we 
observed were far from heterodox, they favored the finance elites above all else—
above the health of the economy, and above the public’s interest. Using our multiple 
perspectives of understanding policymaking, allow us to re-examine the political 
crisis that culminated in these three pieces of legislation and try to interpret why 
some ideas were chosen above others as policy solutions. 
Policies, lobbyists and interest groups had shaped the political arena, making 
businesses, rather than the public, most integral to policymakers’ decisions. In 
support of Campbell’s, theory that policies shape how the group they directly affect 
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relates to politics, as well as Hacker and Pierson’s theory that lobbyists and interest 
groups usurp the public interest, the combination of loosening restrictions on 
campaign finance and loosening restrictions on banking practices created an 
opportunity for Wall Street interest groups to make more money and invest more of 
it in lobbying and controlling politics and policy—encouraging the collusion of 
politicians and Wall Street to the determent of the public’s relation to government.  
This process that took place over multiple administrations of allowing elite 
interests to manipulate policy to drive a blundering deregulatory pursuit of 
economic growth, while ignoring public interest, had plenty of election 
opportunities in which an omniscient public would have thought to seek new 
management. This aligns with Domhoff’s theory that policy and public opinion are 
controlled by elites, as well as Archen and Bartel’s theory that voters will stand by 
whatever or whomever they have been told to support. Whether or not the 
decisions made in 2007 – 2008 reflected the public’s opinion turned out to be less of 
an issue than whether or not the public’s interest was represented in policy 
decisions—it turned out not to be.  
The most disgruntling aspect of the 2007 – 2008 moment in policymaking 
was the policymaker’s abandonment of the public’s interest because it signaled a 
political crisis in the midst of an economic crisis. Democracy failed to represent the 
middle and lower class interests for years and it became most apparent when these 
same underrepresented classes were left with the heaviest burden of the crash. The 
policy helped maintain the elite’s lifestyle in the midst of a crisis that would 
devastate the lives of middleclass homeowners.  
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How any member of the public, affected in such a negative way by the 
economic crisis, still trusts the legislative system is a testament to Archen and 
Bartel’s theory that the public will support anything they are told to support, and 
Mettler’s theory that the public is informed by policy decisions. From these 
perspectives we can explain how measures taken in 2007 – 2008 imprinted the too-
big-to-fail ideology on the public, who continue to trust the financial system despite 
the lack of change in the regulatory mechanisms that maintain market stability.  
Allow me to take you back to the end of 2007 for a moment so that we have a 
more wholesome understanding of how political actors are able to avoid catering to 
the public interest. Trouble is stirring in the financial sector, which has faced a 
period of deregulation as well as bank failures, causing panic amongst the public 
(Blinder 2014). Debt in the US private sector is nearing to five-percent GDP, and top 
finance executives walk away with billions per year in salary (Blinder, 2014). The 
public is in debt personally—they know it—they are indebted to the top executives. 
Public opinion does not support the neoliberal agenda, but their votes do. The public 
votes with their party, hoping each time the candidate will push a few issues the 
public also supports (Archen & Bartels, 2014). It occurs to very few that candidates 
usually only make it onto ballots because of a tie to an elite interest.  
Through the policymaking theorist’s perspectives, and our process of 
examining three crisis-related bills, we have uncovered unpleasant indications that 
public opinion may be disconnected from policy as early as the election stage of the 
political process. The elites therefore no longer need to control public opinion, as 
much as they need to control the public vote—more specifically who the public 
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votes for. Until votes can more accurately reflect the public’s opinion on economic 
matters, there will remain a divide between public opinion and fiscal policy. This 
relief can never come while Congress is more akin to lobbyists and interest groups 
than the actual public, and while those lobbyists and interest groups that claim to 
represent the public constantly subvert economic issues (Hacker & Pierson, 2011).  
We have discovered from our research that policymakers decide fiscal policy absent 
public interest and absent an avenue through which the public can offer their 
opinions on the matter.  
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